Political contributions, voter turnout, and the effects of redistricting by Quigley, David
c© 2019 David Quigley
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS, VOTER TURNOUT, AND THE
EFFECTS OF REDISTRICTING
BY
DAVID QUIGLEY
DISSERTATION
Submitted in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2019
Urbana, Illinois
Doctoral Committee:
Professor Stefan Krasa, Chair
Professor Mark Daniel Bernhardt
Associate Professor Seung-Hyun Hong
Assistant Professor Jorge Lemus
ABSTRACT
Individual contributions to political campaigns are a signiﬁcant aspect of
the political process in the United States. Understanding how the politi-
cal environment aﬀects these contributions increases the understanding of
what drives elections and political campaigns. One aspect of the political
environment is that political campaigns for the U.S. Senate overlap with
campaigns for the U.S. House of Representatives. This may cause individual
contributors to substitute a political contribution to one campaign with a po-
litical contribution to another campaign. Conversely, individual contributors
may see contributions to overlapping campaigns as complements. Individual
contributors are also impacted by redistricting which is the redrawing of the
geographic boundaries of U.S. Congressional Districts every 10 years after the
completion of the U.S. Census. In both these cases, more competitive elec-
tions lead to more individual contributions, and the evidence suggests cam-
paign contributions to diﬀerent political campaigns are complements rather
than substitutes. The available political information also aﬀects potential
voters and their decision to vote or not to vote. A public signal on candidate
quality can decrease voter turnout preventing elections from revealing the
private information of potential voters on candidate quality. Finally, politi-
cal campaigns themselves react to the political environment spending more
on advertising and fundraising when they are more signiﬁcantly impacted by
redistricting. By analyzing all these processes, both empirically and theoret-
ically, we can reach a more complete view of how the interactions between
political actors generate the important political outcomes that we see.
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CHAPTER 1
ARE POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
SUBSTITUTES OR COMPLEMENTS? THE
IMPACT OF U.S. SENATE ELECTIONS
ON INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO
THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1.1 Introduction
In democratic countries, individuals who make contributions to political cam-
paigns often face overlapping campaigns for elected oﬃces at diﬀerent levels.
This creates a strategic decision in how individual contributors should dis-
tribute their contributions among diﬀerent candidates with potentially dif-
ferent levels of power and inﬂuence. An interesting question is whether a
political contribution to one campaign is a substitute for a political contri-
bution to another campaign or whether the presence of multiple overlapping
campaigns increases political engagement resulting in more contributions.
An example of this occurs in the United States where campaigns for the U.S.
Senate necessarily overlap with campaigns for the U.S. House of Representa-
tives. Since there are only 100 U.S. Senators while there 435 members in the
U.S. House of Representatives, an individual Senator can usually wield more
inﬂuence on political and policy outcomes than an individual member of the
House of Representatives. Consequently, when a state has a seat up for elec-
tion in the U.S. Senate, this may cause individual contributors to substitute
toward contributing to a Senatorial campaign and away from contributing to
a campaign for the House of Representatives because of the greater perceived
importance of the Senate seat. On the other hand, the presence of an elec-
tion for a Senate seat in a state may result in increased political engagement
in that state resulting in more contributions to campaigns for both the U.S.
Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives in that state.
Answering this question can help provide insights into the motivations of
political contributors. If contributors view their contributions as increasing
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the probability their preferred candidate wins the election or as a way to
increase their access to or inﬂuence over a particular candidate, then they
are likely to substitute their contributions toward a Senatorial campaign as
a Senator is likely to have greater political and policy inﬂuence compared
to a Representative in the U.S. House. However, if contributors view their
contributions as expressions of their political beliefs or as enjoyment from
participating in the political process, then they may contribute to both U.S.
Senate and House of Representatives campaigns during a Senate election as
a way to further express their political beliefs or as a way to increase their
engagement with the political process. Answering this question can also pro-
vide answers about optimal fundraising strategies for candidates to the U.S.
House of Representatives. The eﬀectiveness of a dollar spent on fundraising
eﬀorts may be higher or lower in the presence of a Senate election depending
on if political contributions are substitutes or complements. Furthermore,
this can provide evidence for additional mechanisms through which a can-
didate at the top of the ballot in an election aﬀects the political fortunes
of downballot candidates. Understanding campaign ﬁnance and downballot
eﬀects leads to a better understanding of how diﬀerent factors aﬀect political
outcomes that are important in democracies.
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that political contributions
to diﬀerent campaigns are more complementary than substitutes. The pres-
ence of a Senate election in a state increases political contributions made by
individuals to campaigns for the U.S. House of Representatives. The top-of-
the-ballot race seems important as the Senate eﬀect is strongest in midterm
election cycles and weaker in Presidential election cycles. Moreover, this ef-
fect is stronger when the incumbent Representative in the U.S. House faces a
competitive election. This supports the supposition that the complementary
eﬀect is driven by an increase in political engagement. A competitive election
for a U.S. House seat is when potential contributors would be presented with
the best opportunities for engagement with the political process at both the
Senate and House of Representatives level.
To analyze the question of whether political contributions are substitutes
or complements, this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides a
review of the existing literature on political contributions and the individuals
who make them. Section 1.3 provides a description of the data on political
contributions. Section 1.4 presents the empirical speciﬁcations along with
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results and analysis. Finally, section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
Early research into campaign contributions focused on trying to link cam-
paign contributions with votes on bills in Congress. However, the results have
been mixed in terms of identifying a causal link between campaign contribu-
tions and votes. Ansolabehere et al. (2003) reviews this literature. Moreover,
Ansolabehere et al. (2003) conclude that the evidence suggests individual con-
tributors are primarily consumption motivated rather than investment mo-
tivated. Individual contributors make their contributions because they value
civic involvement rather than speciﬁcally trying to inﬂuence the policies of
the candidates or trying to increase the likelihood their preferred candidate
wins the election.
More recent research has contributed to showing that political contributors
tend to be wealthier, have higher incomes, are better educated, and are
more likely to be racially White than non-contributors (James 2009). The
contributor's ideology as well as the recipient's ideology has also been shown
to be important Barber et al. 2017; (Ensley 2009; Hill and Huber 2017).
To further understand the motivations of individual contributors several
papers have looked at the destinations of individual contributions in order
to try to reverse engineer the factors that inﬂuence individual contributions.
Francia et al. (2005) and Rhodes et al. (2018) categorize individual contribu-
tors into groups based on similar contribution patterns and then investigate
the similarities within groups and the diﬀerences across groups.
Lowry (2015) examines how the political environment impacts individ-
ual contributions to campaigns. He ﬁnds that the more competitive federal
elections there are in a district, the more contributions are made to federal
election campaigns. This paper examines contribution data at the ZIP Code
level and more directly tests whether political contributions are substitutes
or complements across political campaigns.
Another aspect of political contributions is that they are typically solicited
by campaigns. This has important implications as campaigns target individ-
uals from whom they solicit contributions as well as inducing contributions
to political campaigns (Grant and Rudolph 2002; Hassell and Monson 2014).
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When multiple political campaigns are taking place concurrently, individuals
may receive solicitations from multiple campaigns at the same time aﬀect-
ing their contribution decisions. This paper seeks to investigate the extent
to which political contributions are substitutes between diﬀerent political
campaigns and complements among multiple political campaigns.
1.3 Data
The Federal Election Commission (FEC) requires political campaigns to re-
port information on campaign contributions and campaign spending. This
paper uses information on contributions to political campaigns for the U.S.
House of Representatives from 2002-2010. The reason for this time period
is to avoid potentially confounding eﬀects from the decennial redistricting of
Congressional Districts while including as many U.S. Senate elections as pos-
sible. For contribution transactions $200 and over by individuals, the FEC
requires the campaign to report information on the contributor including the
contribution amount for that transaction, the contributor's name, and the
contributor's address. This allows for the identiﬁcation of contributions at
the ZIP Code level. However, for contribution transactions less than $200,
campaigns are not required to report any transaction-speciﬁc information.
Consequently, for contribution transactions less than $200, the location from
where they originate and analysis of individual transaction amounts cannot
be conducted. Therefore, analysis of the eﬀect of U.S. Senate elections on
campaign contributions at the ZIP Code level is limited to those where the
transaction amount is $200 and over.
In order to control for demographic characteristics of ZIP Codes since these
may impact campaign contributions, data from the decennial U.S. Census
and the American Community Survey (ACS) are used. Demographic con-
trols include population, population density, education attainment, racial
composition, and other information. In order to control for the eﬀect of
income on campaign contributions and campaign spending strategies, data
from the IRS at the ZIP Code level is used to construct the ZIP Code's
average income.
Another important aspect of Congressional Districts is their partisan com-
position. The proportion of Republican Party leaning individuals compared
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to the proportion of Democratic Party individuals in the districts can signiﬁ-
cantly impact campaign contributions and the spending strategies campaigns
use to win elections. This paper uses the Cook Partisan Voting Index (PVI)
to measure the partisan composition of Congressional Districts. The Cook
PVI of a Congressional District is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the aver-
age margin between the Republican Party and Democratic Party vote share
in the last two U.S. Presidential elections within the Congressional District
and the average margin between the parties at the national level. This pa-
per uses the convention that positive margins indicate results in favor of
the Republican party while negative margins indicate results in favor of the
Democratic party. Therefore, a Congressional District with a Cook PVI of
+5 had a margin 5 percentage points more in favor of the Republican Party
compared to the party's performance at national level averaged over that
last two Presidential elections. A Congressional District with a Cook PVI of
-7 had a margin 7 percentage points more in favor of the Democratic Party
compared to the party's performance at the national level averaged over the
last two Presidential elections.
To allow for a ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the eﬀect of partisan composition,
a Congressional District's Cook PVI is placed in a category depending on
the whether the partisan composition is favorable to the incumbent repre-
sentative or not. For example, the category I[0− 5] indicates that the Cook
PVI favors the incumbent representative by 0 to 5 percentage points while
the category O[5 − 10] indicates that the Cook PVI opposes the incumbent
representative by 5 to 10 percentage points. In the case of O[5 − 10], a
Congressional District would be in this category if an incumbent Republi-
can representative was in a district where the Cook PVI was in favor of the
Democratic Party by 5 to 10 percentage points. The categories used for the
analysis are I[0 − 5], I[5 − 10], I[10 − 15], I[15+], O[0 − 5], O[5 − 10], and
O[10+].
To analyze individual campaign contributions, individual campaign contri-
butions are ﬁrst limited to contributions to political campaigns for the U.S.
House of Representatives. These transactions are then aggregated to the ZIP
Code level.
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics for individual campaign contribu-
tions at the ZIP Code level.
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Table 1.1: Individual Contributions Summary Statistics 2001-2010
Variable Number of Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Total ZIP Code Contri. 83,258 18,454 53,869.07
Number of ZIP Code Contri. 83,258 26.13 66.9437
Mean ZIP Code Contri. 83,258 612.10 328.2218
Senate Election 83,258 0.7 0.5109
No Incumbent 83,258 0.0375 0.1846
Average Income (2000 dollars) 83,258 46,167.30 36,011.92
Total ZIP Code Pop 83,258 15,583 15,405.94
Pop Density (per sq. mile) 83,258 1,922.88 5,866.149
Percent College Grads 83,258 0.1579 0.0873
Percent Male 83,258 0.4948 0.0318
Percent White 83,258 0.8142 0.2015
Percent Age 55+ 83,258 0.2611 0.0846
Percent Married 83,258 0.5422 0.1074
Election Cycle 2002 16,165
Election Cycle 2004 16,684
Election Cycle 2006 16,981
Election Cycle 2008 16,651
Election Cycle 2010 16,777
The reason the SenateElection variable is close to 2/3 is because of the
structure of U.S. Senate elections, the number of Senate election cycles in
the sample, and the presence of some special U.S. Senate elections. All these
components are key to the empirical identiﬁcation strategy.
Table 1.2 present the number of ZIP Codes in each Cook PVI category for
a Congressional District in the 2001-2010 period of analysis.
Table 1.2: Cook PVI Category Summary Statistics 2001-2010
Cook PVI Category Number of Obs
I[0− 5] 14,685
I[5− 10] 16,909
I[10− 15] 11,349
I[15+] 21,180
O[0− 5] 9,563
O[5− 10] 4,061
O[10+] 5,538
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1.4 Empirical Speciﬁcations and Results
U.S. Senators are elected to six-year terms, and each state has two Senators
representing it. However, not all Senate seats are up for election at once.
Approximately, a third of the Senate seats are up for election every two
years. Moreover, a particular state usually only has one Senate seat up for
election at a time. The timing of when particular Senate seats are up for
election is largely exogenous being determined by when a state entered the
Union and random chance for how its seats were allocated across two-year
election cycles. An additional factor in the timing of U.S. Senate elections is
the presence of special U.S. Senate elections carried out when a seat becomes
vacant in a non-election year for that seat. As a result of special elections,
a state may have Senate election in a what should have been an oﬀ year for
the state or may even have two Senate elections in one year. After a special
election, the winning candidate serves the remainder of the existing Senate
term for that seat until the seat is up for election again according to the
usual schedule. The exogenous election schedule for Senate seats combined
with a few special elections provide the identiﬁcation for how the presence
of a Senate election impacts individual campaign contributions to the U.S.
House of Representatives.
The model is shown below.
yit = α0 + α1 ∗ SenateElectionis +Xitβ + µi + δt + it (1.1)
The dependent variable is calculated for each ZIP Code, i, in each election
cycle, t. The coeﬃcient α1 is the eﬀect of a Senate election in state s on the
political contribution outcome. The speciﬁcation controls for demographic
characteristics of the ZIP Codes, Xit, and contains ZIP Code ﬁxed eﬀects,
µi, and election cycle ﬁxed eﬀects, δt. Standard errors are clustered at the
ZIP Code level. Table 1.3 presents results on the eﬀects of a Senate election
on individual campaign contributions to the U.S. House of Representatives.
The results show an increase in total political contributions from a ZIP
Code, the number of contributions and the mean contribution. The presence
of a Senate election increases the total political contributions from a ZIP Code
by 1.8%. The number of contributions increases by 1.09% while the mean
contribution increases by 0.74%. This suggests that the presence of a Senate
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Table 1.3: Individual Contri. Results 2001-2010
ln(Tot. Contri.) ln(Count) ln(Mean)
Senate Election 0.01831 0.0109 0.0074
(0.0055)*** (0.0043)** (0.0027)***
ln(Pop) 0.6156 0.597 0.01879
(0.0572)*** (0.0456)*** (0.0280)
ln(Pop Density) 0.0538 0.0231 0.0307
(0.0408) (0.0322) (0.0211)
ln(Avg. Income) 0.3081 0.1929 0.116
(0.0399)*** (0.0323)*** (0.0197)***
Per. College Grads 1.2583 1.2821 -0.0241
(0.3123)*** (0.2436)*** (0.1613)
Per. Male -0.1512 0.163 -0.3145
(0.4348) (0.3428) (0.2203)
Per. White 0.2601 0.139 0.1209
(0.1630) (0.1311) (0.0792)
Per. Age 55+ 1.0993 1.1476 -0.0482
(0.2437)*** (0.1899)*** (0.1237)
Per. Married 0.7168 0.5764 0.14
(0.2098)*** (0.1620)*** (0.1060)
Election Cycle FE Yes Yes Yes
ZIP Code FE Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 83,258 83,258 83,258
*** indicates p < 0.01, ** indicates p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.1
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election increases political engagement resulting in increased contributions
to campaigns for the U.S. House of Representatives. Furthermore, the eﬀect
of a Senate election is greater on the number of contributors compared to
the mean contribution indicating that most of the eﬀect is through new
contributors rather than existing contributors giving more. This suggests
that incumbents in the U.S. House of Representatives could use election
cycles where there's a Senate seat up for election in their state to build up
their campaign's cash reserves for election cycles when there isn't a Senate
seat up for election in their state. This evidence also contributes to the
existing literature that ﬁnds individual political contributions are primarily
motivated by consumption of political experiences rather than investments
in political candidates with an expected return.
A natural extension to these results is to see if the eﬀect varies with the
partisan composition of the Congressional District. Close elections elicit more
political contributions so a Congressional District with a Cook PVI near zero
would be expected to be competitive and consequently, the complementary
eﬀect of Senate elections could be stronger. Table 1.4 presents results when
the a district's Cook PVI category is interacted with the Senate election
indicator.
In comparison to a Congressional District that is competitive, but slightly
leans towards the incumbent, the eﬀect of a Senate election in noncompetitive
districts where the incumbent has a signiﬁcant advantage is much smaller.
The same holds true in districts where the incumbent is at a disadvantage
relative to the partisan lean of the district. These eﬀects are primarily driven
by changes in the number of contributions rather than changes in the average
size of a contribution.
These results provide more evidence for the complementary eﬀect of Senate
elections. The complementary eﬀect is strongest when the incumbent faces
a competitive election, but still has the advantage. Since, by deﬁnition, the
incumbent has won a previous election, this provides strong evidence that
the complementary eﬀect of Senate elections is being driven by increases in
political engagement. Political engagement should be high when an incum-
bent representative is favored, but still faces a competitive election as this
will motivate the incumbent's supporters. If the incumbent already has a
signiﬁcant advantage or if the incumbent is already likely to lose, then the
incumbent's supporters are less likely to be politically engaged and hence,
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Table 1.4: Interaction with the Cook PVI Category 2001-2010
ln(Tot. Contri.) ln(Count) ln(Mean)
Senate Election 0.0541 0.0385 0.0157
(0.0148)*** (0.0117)** (0.0073)***
Senate*CookPVICat
I[0− 5] omitted omitted omitted
I[5− 10] 0.0239 0.0314 -0.0075
(0.0200) (0.0160)* (0.0099)
I[10− 15] -0.0586 -0.0427 -0.0159
(0.0222)*** (0.0178)** (0.0110)
I[15+] -0.0868 -0.0679 -0.0189
(0.0185)*** (0.0146)*** (0.0093)**
O[0− 5] -0.0810 -0.0672 -0.0138
(0.0244)*** (0.0196)*** (0.0120)
O[5− 10] -0.1153 -0.1068 -0.0085
(0.0315)*** (0.0255)*** (0.0154)
O[10+] -0.0460 -0.0572 0.0112
(0.0289) (0.0224)** (0.0145)
Election Cycle FE Yes Yes Yes
ZIP Code FE Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 83,258 83,258 83,258
*** indicates p < 0.01, ** indicates p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.1
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less likely to engage in activities such as campaign contributions. Senate elec-
tions then increase political engagement when supporters are most receptive
to being activated politically.
1.5 Conclusion
Important top-of-the-ballot races can create greater levels of political en-
gagement that beneﬁt downballot candidates. This paper ﬁnds that the
presence of a Senate election in a state increases political contributions made
by individuals to campaigns for the U.S. House of Representatives. This
increase is primarily driven by an increase in the number of contributions,
although there is also an increase in the size of the average contribution.
Which race is the top-of-the-ballot race is also important. The Senate eﬀect
is strongest in midterm election cycles and weaker in Presidential election
cycles. Furthermore, this eﬀect is stronger when potential contributors are
more receptive to political engagement such as when the incumbent Repre-
sentative faces a competitive, but still favorable political environment. The
evidence strengthens the conclusion that individual contributions are driven
primarily by a consumption motivation rather than a strategic incentive.
The results further demonstrate another mechanism through which down-
ballot candidates are aﬀected by elections for oﬃces at higher levels of gov-
ernment. The political environment created by these elections for higher
level government positions is often beyond the control of the downballot can-
didates. However, downballot candidates can and do change their campaign
strategies in response to factors aﬀecting the top-of-the-ballot races. Given
that positions at lower levels of government can still have a signiﬁcant impact
on the daily lives of people within their political districts, understanding the
election dynamics of races for these lower level positions is vital for under-
standing governmental outcomes and the impact of the political process on
people's lives.
11
CHAPTER 2
PUBLIC INFORMATION AND VOTER
TURNOUT
2.1 Introduction
Before an election, potential voters receive information about the candidates
from a plethora of sources. Some sources are available to everyone such as
national media and endorsements by well-known politicians. Other sources
are more private in nature such as local media, conversations with friends and
family, personal interactions with candidates at campaign events, and private
research on the candidates. Potential voters must combine the information
from these diﬀerent sources in order to make decisions on whether to vote in
the election or not, and if they decide to vote, for whom to vote.
A particularly interesting case is when public information seems to contra-
dict the private information a potential voter has. In this case, the potential
voter has to decide which is more likely to be correct. If a potential voter
is suﬃciently worried about being misinformed, the individual may opt to
abstain from voting.
One reason to have an election, however, is to aggregate the private infor-
mation voters have. Public information may aﬀect the ability of elections to
aggregate private information by aﬀecting voter turnout. In order to exam-
ine this possibility, I analyze a model of an information aggregating election
allowing voters to abstain in response to a public signal on candidate quality
before the election takes place. I ﬁnd that the existence of a public signal
can have a negative impact on how potential voters use their private informa-
tion. In particular, potential voters may vote according to the public signal
regardless of their own private information or may abstain when their pri-
vate information contradicts public information. This paper examines how
parameters such as the quality of the public information, the quality of the
private information, and the expected number of potential voters aﬀects voter
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behavior. In this paper, section 2.2 presents a review of the existing literature
on public information, information aggregation, and voter abstention. Sec-
tion 2.3 provides the set up for the model, and section 2.4 presents analysis
of voter behavior. Some results from the model's equilibrium are analyzed in
section 2.5 which contains some numerical simulations of the model. Finally,
section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
One source of public information are newspapers especially when they en-
dorse particular candidates. Previous literature has examined endorsements
from the perspective of determining how they impact voters' beliefs about
political candidates. While there is evidence that voters try to ﬁlter out per-
ceived bias in endorsements, nonetheless, there is substantial evidence that
endorsements inﬂuence voting behavior. Kahn and Kenney (2002) exam-
ine newspaper endorsements in U.S. Senatorial elections between 1988 and
1992 and ﬁnd that voters express more positive feelings toward the endorsed
candidate. Ladd and Lenz (2009) use a switch in the pattern of endorse-
ments by newspapers in the 1997 general U.K. election to identify the eﬀect
of endorsements on voters. In the 1997 general election in the U.K., several
newspaper which had previously supported the Conservative Party switched
to endorsing the Labour Party. Ladd and Lenz (2009) ﬁnd that this switch
in endorsements caused a substantial number of voters to also switch their
support from the Conservative Party to the Labour Party.
Chiang and Knight (2011) estimate a model using data from newspaper
endorsements and voter surveys to determine how voters incorporate infor-
mation from endorsements from biased sources. Their estimates show that
voters are more inﬂuence by more credible endorsements such as when a right-
leaning paper endorses the left candidate. Other empirical and experimental
evidence comes from McDermott (2006). That paper uses endorsements of
political candidates by labor unions. Using survey data and hypothetical sit-
uations posed to voters in an experiment, McDermott (2006) ﬁnds evidence
that endorsements by labor unions provided information to both left-leaning
and right-leaning voters.
Existing theoretical research into endorsements suggests that biased en-
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dorsers or prohibiting endorsements in the ﬁrst place can be beneﬁcial to
voters. Calvert (1985) examines a utility maximizing voter who chooses be-
tween two alternatives. The voter can seek the advice from a single source
that can endorse one alternative, neither alternative, or both alternatives.
In some cases, the voter may optimally choose a source with a similar bias
to the voter since if the source endorses the opposite alternative, this con-
veys signiﬁcant information to the voter. On the other hand, prohibiting
endorsements may be welfare maximizing if the political candidates change
their policy platforms in order to gain endorsements from entities with their
own policy interests (Grossman and Helpman 1999; Chakraborty and Ghosh
2016). Here, the beneﬁt from the informational content of the endorsements
is outweighed by the policy distortions caused the political candidates com-
peting for the endorsements.
Another area of related literature looks at how voter abstention aﬀects
the information aggregating properties of elections. When all voters vote
sincerely, the Condorcet Jury Theorem shows that elections tend to pick the
correct candidate from the information that voters have. However, when
abstention is allowed, it is no longer clear that the correct candidate is more
likely to win. Information on who the correct candidate is may be lost from
abstaining voters. Several papers show that rational voters will abstain in
equilibrium in order to defer to more informed voters (Austen-Smith and
Banks 1996; Fedddersen and Pesendorfer 1996; Fedddersen and Pesendorfer
1999; Krishna and Morgan 2012; McMurray 2013). These papers, though,
also show that elections are still able to aggregate the information voters
have and more often than not elect the correct candidate.
This paper diﬀers from previous research by incorporating a public signal
into a model of an information aggregating election to determine the eﬀect
of public information on voter turnout.
2.3 Model Setup
There are two possible states of the world: ωA and ωB. In ωA, candidate A
is a higher quality candidate or a more competent candidate than candidate
B. More generally, candidate A can be said to have a higher valence than
candidate B in state ωA. Conversely, in ωB, candidate B is the better can-
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didate. The probability of ωA and ωB, P(ωA) and P(ωB) respectively, are
assumed to be equal to 1/2.
Before the election takes place, a public signal is revealed which contains
imperfect information about which candidate is the higher quality candidate.
Speciﬁcally, the public signal is wA in state ωA with probability q0 and signal
wB in state ωA with probability 1 − q0. With q0 > 1/2, the signal provides
some information about the state of the world. The probability of receiving
signal wB in state ωB and signal wA in state ωB are also q0 and 1 − q0,
respectively. All potential voters see the same public signal.
To allow for voter abstention, the number of potential voters is uncertain.
The number of potential voters in an election is Poisson distributed with
mean n. Potential voters also receive private signals about the quality of the
candidates. Voters receive signal sA in state ωA with probability q1 and signal
sB in state ωA with probability 1 − q1. The signal is informative under the
assumption that q1 > 1/2. The probability of receiving signal sB in state ωB
and signal sA in state ωB are also q1 and 1− q1, respectively. Voters can vote
for candidate A, vote for candidate B, or abstain based on the information
provided by the public signal and the private signal they received.
The candidate that receives a majority of the votes wins the election. In
the event of a tie, each candidate has a 50% probability of winning.
Since voters receive more utility from the election of the higher quality
candidate compared to the election of the lower quality candidate, the voter's
decision on which action to take depends on his or her beliefs about the state
of the world. Let U(A, ωA) be the utility the voter receives when candidate
A is elected in state ωA. Then U(A, ωA) > U(B,ωA). Moreover, the action
the voter takes only changes the outcome of the election when that voter
is pivotal. If the voter chooses to vote for candidate A, then the voter is
pivotal when either the election is tied between candidate A and candidate
B or when candidate A is down by one vote. Therefore, the expected utility
of voting for candidate A is given by
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EU(votingA) =
P(mA1 = 0|ωA,Ω) P(ωA|Ω) U(A, ωA) + P(mA1 = 0|ωB,Ω) P(ωB|Ω) U(A, ωB)
+ (1/2) P(mA1 = −1|ωA,Ω) P(ωA|Ω) U(A, ωA) + (1/2) P(mA1 = −1|ωA,Ω) P(ωA|Ω) U(B,ωA)
+ (1/2) P(mA1 = −1|ωB,Ω) P(ωB|Ω) U(A, ωB) + (1/2) P(mA1 = −1|ωB,Ω) P(ωB|Ω) U(B,ωB)
(2.1)
where mA1 is the vote margin for candidate A, Ω = {sA, wi}, and wi is the
public signal.
Then a voter's utility is given by
U = max{EU(votingA),EU(votingB),EU(abstaining)} (2.2)
The equilibrium concept in this paper is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Based on their private signal and the public signal, voters are Bayesian in up-
dating their beliefs. Voters' expected utility is determined by the probability
the higher quality candidate is elected versus the lower quality candidate.
2.4 Analysis of the Model
The strategies used by potential voters depend on a comparison of the ex-
pected utilities from voting for candidate A, voting for candidate B, and
abstaining. The problem is symmetric between potential voters with signal
sA and potential voters with signal sB so for conciseness only the analysis
for those with signal sA is presented. The problem can be further simpliﬁed
by recognizing the fact that the action that maximizes a potential voter's
expected utility depends on the diﬀerence between having the higher qual-
ity candidate in oﬃce compared to the lower quality candidate for a given
state of the world. Therefore, the problem can be expressed in terms of this
diﬀerence in utility. Under the assumption that the candidates are ex ante
symmetric, this diﬀerence is the same whether candidate A or candidate B
is the higher quality candidate. Let this diﬀerence in utility be denoted by u.
To analyze the problem, ﬁrst consider the diﬀerence between the expected
utility of voting for candidate A and the expected utility of abstaining for a
potential voter who receives signal sA. This diﬀerence is given by
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EU(votingA)− EU(abstaining) =
(1/2) P(mA1 = 0|ωA,Ω) P(ωA|Ω)u− (1/2) P(mA1 = 0|ωB,Ω) P(ωB|Ω)u
+ (1/2) P(mA1 = −1|ωA,Ω) P(ωA|Ω)u− (1/2) P(mA1 = −1|ωB,Ω) P(ωB|Ω)u
(2.3)
In cases where the potential voter is not pivotal in determining the outcome
of the election by either breaking a tie in favor of candidate A or creating a tie
when candidate A is down by one vote, the expected utility from both actions
is the same. Consequently, these terms are irrelevant for the potential voter's
decision. The terms that are consequential are from when the potential voter
is pivotal for the outcome of the election so that diﬀerent actions result in
diﬀerent levels of utility.
The potential voter with signal sA will vote for candidate A over abstaining
if the diﬀerence between the expected utilities from these actions is positive.
Derived from equation (2.3), the condition under which this happens is given
by
P(ωA|Ω)
P(ωB|Ω) ≥
P(mA1 = 0|ωB,Ω) + P(mA1 = −1|ωB,Ω)
P(mA1 = 0|ωA,Ω) + P(mA1 = −1|ωA,Ω)
(2.4)
Intuitively, when the voter's beliefs in the quality of candidate A are higher
than the probability of mistakenly voting for the lower quality candidate, the
voter will vote over abstaining. Beliefs on the state are given by Bayesian
updating so
P(ωA|Ω) = P(sA|ωA) P(wi|ωA)
P(sA|ωA) P(wi|ωA) + P(sA|ωA) P(wi|ωA) (2.5)
Since the population of eligible voters is Poisson distributed, the vote mar-
gin for candidate A follows the Skellam distribution, which is the distribution
for the diﬀerence between two Poisson distributions.
P(mA1 = k|ωA) = e−n
(
q1
1− q1
) k
2
Ik
(
2n
√
(1− q1)q1
)
(2.6)
where Ik is the modiﬁed Bessel function of the ﬁrst kind.
The voters' beliefs are determined by their private signals, the public signal,
and the quality of both the private and public signals. Since voters use
Bayesian updating, the information provided by public signal is determined
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by the ratio of a correct signal to an incorrect signal. This is given by(
q0
1− q0
)
(2.7)
To simplify the analysis of the potential voter's decision, deﬁne mi0 to be a
real number such that
(
q0
1− q0
)
=
(
q1
1− q1
)mi0
(2.8)
The information provided by the public signal is expressed in terms equiva-
lent to the information provided by a potential voter's private signal. Deﬁne
mA0 as the informationally equivalent margin of votes in favor of candidate A
provided by the public signal. This can be interpreted as an inherent advan-
tage in the margin of votes that candidate A has before the election takes
place although whether a voter is pivotal in the election is still determined
by the actual number of votes for candidate A and for candidate B.
After using Bayesian updating, a voter with signal sA will vote for candi-
date A over abstaining if
(
q1
1− q1
)mA0 +1
≥ P(m
A
1 = 0|ωB,Ω) + P(mA1 = −1|ωB,Ω)
P(mA1 = 0|ωA,Ω) + P(mA1 = −1|ωA,Ω)
(2.9)
The probability that the voter is pivotal in the election depends on the extent
to which other voters abstain from voting. This abstention not only changes
the probability that the voter is pivotal, it also changes the information
contained in being the pivotal voter. If the election is tied when voters with
signal sA abstain at some rate rA, then there are sA signals that were received
by potential voters, but are not reﬂected in the vote margin. On the other
hand, this reduction in signal sA voters is constant across states of the world
so even in the state where candidate B is the higher quality candidate, there
are missing sA voters. Moreover, in response to the abstention rate of sA
voters, voters with signal sB may, under certain conditions, ﬁnd it optimal
to also abstain with some rate rB. The relative abstention rates between the
two types of voters changes the probability a particular voter is pivotal and
changes the information contained in the event the voter is pivotal.
Accounting for the possibility of abstention for both types of voters, a voter
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with signal sA chooses to vote for candidate A over abstaining when
1 ≥
(
1− q1
q1
)mA0 +1 e−nB I0 (z) + e−nB ( q1(1−rB)(1−q1)(1−rA)) 12 I1 (z)
e−nA I0 (z) + e−nA
(
(1−q1)(1−rB)
q1(1−rA)
) 1
2
I1 (z)
(2.10)
where nB = n(q1(1−rB)+(1−q1)(1−rA)), nA = n((1−q1)(1−rB)+q1(1−rA)),
and z = 2n
√
(1− q1)q1(1− rA). Similarly, for voters with signal sB, they
will vote for candidate B over abstaining when
1 ≥
(
1− q1
q1
)−mA0 +1 e−nA I0 (z) + e−nA ( q1(1−rA)(1−q1)(1−rB)) 12 I1 (z)
e−nB I0 (z) + e−nB
(
(1−q1)(1−rA)
q1(1−rB)
) 1
2
I1 (z)
(2.11)
where again nB = n(q1(1− rB) + (1− q1)(1− rA)), nA = n((1− q1)(1− rB) +
q1(1− rA)), and z = 2n
√
(1− q1)q1(1− rA). These two equations deﬁne an
equilibrium in this election.
The utility of a signal sA voter is then given by
max{usA , 0} (2.12)
where
usA =
e−nA I0 (z) + e−nA
(
(1− q1)(1− rB)
q1(1− rA)
) 1
2
I1 (z)
−
(
1− q1
q1
)mA0 +1 [
e−nB I0 (z) + e−nB
(
q1(1− rB)
(1− q1)(1− rA)
) 1
2
I1 (z)
] (2.13)
Equation (2.13) is derived from the equilibrium condition for signal sA voters
in equation (2.10). The utility of a signal sB voter has a similar expression.
With utility functions of the voters deﬁned and the equilibrium conditions
derived, it can be shown that an equilibrium in the election exists for diﬀerent
values of the expected voter population n and diﬀerent results when the
public signal is diﬀerent mA0 .
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Proposition 1. There exists an equilibrium in this game.
Proof. See Appendix A.1 for proof.
2.5 Equilibrium Results
The character of the equilibrium depends signiﬁcantly on the values of the
parameters in the model. The eﬀect of the public signal can reduce the
likelihood the higher quality candidate wins the election. When mA0 ≤ −1,
then all potential voters have a dominant strategy to vote for candidate B
regardless of their private signal. This is an equilibrium because if everyone
always votes for candidate B, then the only time a potential voter is pivotal
is if either no other potential voters vote or if only one other potential voter
votes. In either case, the information from the public signal outweighs the
private information from the potential voter's signal so the dominant strategy
for the potential voter is to vote for candidate B.
On the other hand, when −1 < mA0 < 0, an equilibrium where potential
voters with signal sB always vote and potential voters with signal sA abstain
at some rate r∗A can exist. Some potential voters with signal sA abstain in
equilibrium to reduce the likelihood that candidate A wins the election when
candidate B is the higher quality candidate. In this type of equilibrium, the
value of mA0 aﬀects the abstention rate r
∗
A.
Proposition 2. For n suﬃciently large, as the quality of the public signal
increases as measured by mA0 decreasing, the equilibrium abstention rate, r
∗
A,
for potential voters with signal sA increases.
Proof. See Appendix A.2 for proof.
Intuitively, as the public signal becomes less informative due to lower qual-
ity information, potential voters will rely more on their private signal and
vote according to that signal. Figure 2.1 shows this relationship. In the ﬁg-
ure, as the quality of the public signal increases, the abstention rate increases
because potential voters become more concerned that their private signal is
wrong. From the perspective of potential voters, the increase in the qual-
ity of the public signal is equivalent to the margin increasing for the other
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Figure 2.1: The Eﬀect of Public Signal Quality on the Equilibrium
Abstention Rate
candidate. This margin can have a decimal value depending on the quality
of the public signal relative to the quality of the potential voter's private
signal. When the margin is close to 0, potential voters view the public sig-
nal as uninformative and vote according to their private signal resulting in
no abstention. As the margin moves away from 0 because the public signal
becomes more informative, potential voters start to abstain because of their
belief that their private signal may be incorrect. At this point, as the quality
of the public signal increases, the abstention rate increases because potential
voters believe their vote is more likely to result in mistakenly electing the
lower quality candidate. The values used for this numerical simulation are
n = 10 and q1 = 0.52.
A potential implication of this result is that if potential voters trust media
sources less and as a result, view public information from media sources as
less informative, they may be more willing to vote even if they are no more
informed than they were before. In this case, potential voters trust their
private signals more making them believe their vote is less likely to result in
the incorrect candidate winning the election. Perhaps counter intuitively, this
suggests as distrust in the media increases voter turnout rates may actually
increase and not decrease.
The eﬀect of other parameters of the model on voter abstention rates are
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Figure 2.2: The Eﬀect of Population on the Equilibrium Abstention Rate
less clear as they aﬀect the not only the probability that a potential voter
votes for the correct candidate, but also the probability that the voter is
pivotal. In order to analyze the eﬀect of the population mean n or the signal
quality q1 on the abstention rate in this equilibrium, numerical simulations
are used. The baseline parameters for the simulation are mA0 = −0.9, n = 10,
and q1 = 0.52 which corresponds to a small, relatively close election with
moderately informed voters.
Figure 2.2 shows that as the population mean increases, the abstention
rate of signal sA voters decreases. This is because under these parameters
with higher turnout more likely, signal sA voters are more willing to vote
since the chance of voting incorrectly and changing the outcome of the elec-
tion is smaller. These results suggest a contributing factor behind lower voter
turnout in local and state elections compared to national elections is absten-
tion among potential voters who are concerned about casting a mistaken
pivotal vote because their private signals conﬂict with the public signal. If
the individual voter is uncertain about the information he or she has, then
casting an incorrect vote is more costly when there are fewer other potential
voters so that an individual vote has a higher probability of inﬂuencing the
election. Therefore, the optimal strategy can be to abstain even when the
potential voter is no less informed than an other potential voter.
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Figure 2.3: The Eﬀect of Signal Quality on the Equilibrium Abstention
Rate
The quality of private signals received by potential voters also has a sig-
niﬁcant impact on the abstention rate of potential voters. Figure 2.3 shows
that as the quality of potential voters' private signals increases holding the
quality of the public signal constant, the abstention rate of signal sA voters
decreases. As potential voters' quality of information increases, potential
voters believe their vote is less likely to be a mistake regardless of what
the public signal says. Therefore, signal sA voters are more willing to vote.
This suggests electorates where potential voters interact more directly with
candidates will have higher voter turnout rates because the quality of their
private signal is presumably higher. Moreover, to the extent that the public
signal decreases voter turnout, a way combat this eﬀect is to better educate
potential voters to seek their own high quality information. This reduces the
concern of potential voters that their information is incorrect making them
more likely to vote.
The results of this model suggest that public information can negatively
impact the quality of the candidate that wins the election by causing informed
potential voters to abstain. This is less of a problem when potential voters
view the public signal as less informative since abstention rates are lower.
Consequently, the election aggregates more information from voters trust
public information less. The numerical simulations also suggest that elections
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with larger electorates and electorates where potential voters have better
private information should see higher participation rates. In these cases, the
higher quality candidate should more often win the election. While voter
turnout rates depend on a multitude of factors, public information can have
an impact on voter turnout rates and aﬀect the election through multiple
channels.
2.6 Conclusion
Given the importance of national sources of information for elections, this
paper analyzes how that public information aﬀects the decisions of potential
voters. While having a public signal may provide potential voters with more
information with which to make their decisions, it can have adverse impacts
on voter behavior because of strategic considerations by these individuals. If
a potential voter's private information conﬂicts with the public information,
the voter may ignore his or her own information or choose to strategically
abstain in order to avoid casting what he or she believes to be an incorrect
vote. Since the public signal is imperfectly informative, this can reduce the
eﬀectiveness with which an election is able to aggregate voter information.
The results of this paper suggest that in environments where potential
voters may abstain, having substantial amounts of public information can
reduce the probability of electing a high quality candidate. The ability to
reduce public information may not be feasible in many cases especially when
there is no single authority that can exercise this type of control, but the
negative eﬀect of public information is smaller in cases where the electorate is
larger and when potential voters have higher quality private signals. In cases
where public information has a substantial impact on the election, promoting
more direct channels between candidates and potential voters may help to
increase people's quality of information and increase voter turnout through
the mechanisms presented in this paper. Although many factors aﬀect voter
turnout rates and public information may have signiﬁcant direct impacts on
elections, public information can also aﬀect elections through voter turnout
and be a contributing factor to low voter turnout rates.
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CHAPTER 3
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS,
CAMPAIGN SPENDING, AND
REDISTRICTING
3.1 Introduction
In the U.S., the process to redraw Congressional Districts for the U.S. House
of Representatives takes place every 10 years after the U.S. Census. This
redistricting process can be highly disruptive for political campaign contrib-
utors as well as the political candidates running for oﬃce. Potential campaign
contributors may be placed in a Congressional District with a diﬀerent in-
cumbent compared to before, and political campaigns may decide they need
to respond to the changes to their constituents in order to win their race.
Given the stakes involved with the control of the U.S. House of Represen-
tatives, understanding how campaign contributors and political campaigns
respond to the redistricting process is critical to understanding U.S. politics.
The redistricting process in the U.S. is the response of the U.S. Consti-
tution to changes in the population of the U.S. The decennial U.S. Census
measures these changes. Some areas of the U.S. experience higher population
growth rates compared to other areas with slower population growth rates or
even negative population growth rates. As a result, states in the U.S. change
with respect to the fraction of the U.S. population within their borders. This
necessitates a reapportionment of the number of representatives from each
state in the U.S. House of Representatives. States whose fraction of the U.S.
population fall may lose Representatives in Congress while those states that
increase their faction of the U.S. population may gain representatives. Ei-
ther way, states redraw the Congressional Districts within their boundaries
in response to the number of Congressional Representatives assigned to them
by the rules in the U.S. Constitution.
The importance of money in U.S. politics has been pontiﬁcated by aca-
demics and pundits alike. Contributions to political campaigns are tracked
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and analyzed to look for undue inﬂuence or for better understanding of the
electorate. Spending by political campaigns is analyzed to understand the
priorities of the candidates and to see if they are successful in persuading
people to vote for them. This paper investigates the intersection between
political contributions, campaign spending, and the redistricting process in
order to provide insights into the U.S. political process. Using the redistrict-
ing process after the 2000 and 2010 U.S. Censuses, this paper analyzes how
contribution patterns by individuals change as ZIP Codes are drawn into
new Congressional Districts. Furthermore, this paper examines how cam-
paign spending strategies change in response to new Congressional Districts
analyzing campaign spending on fundraising activities and advertising.
Congressional Districts that are in more competitive Cook PVI categories
after redistricting are found to have increased individual contributions. This
eﬀect is both on the extensive margin with more contributions and on the
intensive margin with a higher average contribution. Moreover, individuals
contributing to the challenger respond even when the incumbent's advantage
remains substantial. This contrasts with individuals contributing to incum-
bents whose responses are signiﬁcantly only when the incumbent faces a
competitive election. Furthermore, this paper also ﬁnds that ZIP Codes that
move to new Congressional Districts contribute more. Political campaigns
respond to changes in their candidates' constituents by increasing campaign
spending on fundraising and advertising which may in part explain why ZIP
Codes that move to new Congressional Districts contribute more. However,
these eﬀects are only signiﬁcant in the election cycle immediately following
the redrawing of Congressional boundaries suggesting that both contributors
and campaigns adapt quickly to the new political environment.
To explore the consequences of redistricting further, this paper is organized
into the following sections. Section 3.2 reviews the existing literature on
political contributions and the eﬀects of redistricting. Section 3.3 provides
a description of the data used to analyze individual campaign contributions
and campaign spending strategies. In section 3.4, the empirical speciﬁcations
are presented along with the results and analysis. Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 Literature Review
Early research into campaign contributions focused on trying to link cam-
paign contributions with votes on bills in Congress. However, the results have
been mixed in terms of identifying a causal link between campaign contribu-
tions and votes. Ansolabehere et al. (2003) reviews this literature. Moreover,
Ansolabehere et al. (2003) conclude that the evidence suggests individual con-
tributors are primarily consumption motivated rather than investment mo-
tivated. Individual contributors make their contributions because they value
civic involvement rather than speciﬁcally trying to inﬂuence the policies of
the candidates or trying to increase the likelihood their preferred candidate
wins the election.
The redistricting process changes the relationship between candidates for
the U.S. House of Representatives and potential contributors. Various stud-
ies have examined how this relationship changes after redistricting and its
eﬀect on electoral outcomes. McKee (2008) ﬁnds that potential voters are
less likely to be able to recall the incumbent representative in their district
in the ﬁrst election cycle after they have changed districts as a result of re-
districting compared to those who stayed in the same district. Crespin and
Edwards (2016) examines a similar research question to this paper and ﬁnds
that candidates in districts that change more after the redistricting process
receive less contributions from individuals within their district, but more
contributions from individuals outside their district.
Theoretical treatments of redistricting have looked at how the political
party in control of the redistricting process may draw districts to increase
their representation in the legislature above their share of votes in elections.
An early treatment of the subject, Owen and Grofman (1988), abstracted
from geographical constraints, but found in their model that the party in con-
trol of the redistricting process did not signiﬁcantly disadvantage the other
party because of uncertainty about who the electorate in future elections
would support. Sherstyuk (1998) examined the extent to which geographical
constraints may prevent the party in control of redistricting from fully tak-
ing advantage of being in control of the process. She ﬁnds that the party in
control can create a close to optimal district map even when the districts are
required to be contiguous. Friedman and Holden (2008) reexamine how the
party in control of the redistricting process should construct the optimal dis-
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trict map and ﬁnd that the party in control should group extreme supporters
from both parties in the same district while matching moderate supporters
from both parties in the other districts. Gul and Pesendorfer (2010) diﬀers
from Friedman and Holden (2008) by giving the party in control of the re-
districting process less information about the preferences of voters who are
to be assigned to districts. The result is that the party in control of the re-
districting process uses the traditional strategies for redistricting of packing
opposing voters in highly concentrated districts and cracking its own sup-
porters over multiple districts to increase the number of seats the party is
likely to win.
Empirical studies have attempted to determine if they can ﬁnd the eﬀects
of party-controlled redistricting on electoral outcomes such as the level of
electoral competition including the extent to which incumbents face qual-
ity challengers and polarization. Carson et al. (2014) and Henderson et al.
(2018) are papers that examine how redistricting aﬀects electoral competi-
tion. Carson et al. (2014) ﬁnds that Congressional districts drawn by partisan
legislatures are less electorally competitive compared with maps drawn as a
result of court cases or by independent commissions. On the other hand,
Henderson et al. (2018) use alternative, but never implemented Congres-
sional district maps compared to the actually implemented map and ﬁnd
that even independent commissions tend to develop maps that protect in-
cumbent politicians. Hetherington et al. (2003) and Murphy and Yoshinaka
(2009) investigate when quality challengers to incumbents emerge as a result
of the redistricting process. They ﬁnd that quality challengers to incumbents
tend to emerge immediately after redistricting has taken place and fade over
time the further the election is from the last redistricting cycle. Carson et al.
(2007) attempt to measure the extent to which party-controlled redistricting
has contributed to polarization in the U.S. House of Representatives. They
ﬁnd a positive, but small eﬀect of redistricting contributing to the recent
increase in polarization.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by not only incorporating
analysis of how redistricting impacts campaign contributions, but also inves-
tigating how it eﬀects campaign spending. Since campaign contributions and
campaign spending are determined jointly, only by looking at both sides of a
campaign's money ﬂow can the eﬀect of redistricting on the political process
be properly examined.
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3.3 Data
The Federal Election Commission (FEC) requires political campaigns to re-
port information on campaign contributions and campaign spending. This
paper uses information on contributions to political campaigns for the U.S.
House of Representatives from 1999-2012. For contribution transactions $200
and over by individuals, the FEC requires the campaign to report informa-
tion on the contributor including the contribution amount for that trans-
action, the contributor's name, and the contributor's address. This allows
for the identiﬁcation of contributions at the ZIP Code level which can then
be combined with data on the ZIP Code's Congressional District to inves-
tigate how redistricting aﬀects campaign contributions. However, for con-
tribution transactions less than $200, campaigns are not required to report
any transaction-speciﬁc information. Consequently, for contribution trans-
actions less than $200, the location from where they originate and analysis
of individual transaction amounts cannot be conducted. Therefore, analysis
of the eﬀect of redistricting on campaign contributions at the ZIP Code level
is limited to those where the transaction amount is $200 and over.
Political campaigns are also required to report total campaign spending for
an election cycle. Furthermore, data on individual campaign expenditures
from the FEC is available starting with the 2003-2004 election cycle. Infor-
mation on individual expenditures includes the amount, date, and purpose
of the transaction as well as the name and address of the recipient. This
paper categorizes those transactions into fundraising expenses, advertising
costs, and other expenditures. Other expenditures includes administrative
expenses like salaries and fee payments, travel reimbursements, and other
miscellaneous expenses. This data allows for the analysis of how campaigns
allocate their available resources across diﬀerent campaign activities in re-
sponse to changes to their Congressional District after redistricting.
In order to control for demographic characteristics of ZIP Codes and
Congressional Districts since these may impact campaign contributions and
spending, data from the decennial U.S. Census and the American Commu-
nity Survey (ACS) are used. Demographic controls for the relevant level
of geography include population, population density, education attainment,
racial composition, and other information. In order to control for the eﬀect
of income on campaign contributions and campaign spending strategies, data
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from the IRS at the ZIP Code level is used to construct the ZIP Code's av-
erage income. Average income for Congressional Districts is also used as a
control.
Another important aspect of Congressional Districts is their partisan com-
position. The proportion of Republican Party leaning individuals compared
to the proportion of Democratic Party individuals in the districts can signiﬁ-
cantly impact campaign contributions and the spending strategies campaigns
use to win elections. This paper uses the Cook Partisan Voting Index (PVI)
to measure the partisan composition of Congressional Districts. The Cook
PVI of a Congressional District is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the aver-
age margin between the Republican Party and Democratic Party vote share
in the last two U.S. Presidential elections within the Congressional District
and the average margin between the parties at the national level. This pa-
per uses the convention that positive margins indicate results in favor of
the Republican party while negative margins indicate results in favor of the
Democratic party. Therefore, a Congressional District with a Cook PVI of
+5 had a margin 5 percentage points more in favor of the Republican Party
compared to the party's performance at national level averaged over that
last two Presidential elections. A Congressional District with a Cook PVI of
-7 had a margin 7 percentage points more in favor of the Democratic Party
compared to the party's performance at the national level averaged over the
last two Presidential elections. The measure is used to determine the impact
of redistricting on the Congressional District's partisan composition.
To allow for a ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the eﬀect of partisan composition,
a Congressional District's Cook PVI is placed in a category depending on
the whether the partisan composition is favorable to the incumbent repre-
sentative or not. For example, the category I[0− 5] indicates that the Cook
PVI favors the incumbent representative by 0 to 5 percentage points while
the category O[5 − 10] indicates that the Cook PVI opposes the incumbent
representative by 5 to 10 percentage points. In the case of O[5 − 10], a
Congressional District would be in this category if an incumbent Republi-
can representative was in a district where the Cook PVI was in favor of the
Democratic Party by 5 to 10 percentage points. The categories used for the
analysis are I[0 − 5], I[5 − 10], I[10 − 15], I[15+], O[0 − 5], O[5 − 10], and
O[10+].
Redistricting then can induce a change in the Cook PVI category to which a
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Congressional District belongs. Tracking these changes allows for an analysis
of how the political environment impacts political contributions. Changes to
the Cook PVI category are organized into small changes which include shifts
between consecutive categories such as I[15+]↔ I[10− 15], medium changes
which include larger shifts between categories such as I[15+]↔ I[5−10], and
large changes for any category changes like I[15+]↔ I[0− 5] and larger.
To measure the eﬀect of redistricting on political outcomes, measuring
the extent to which contributors and campaigns are exposed to redistricting
is required. At the ZIP Code level, this paper assigns a number between
0 and 1 to each ZIP Code which is the fraction of the ZIP Code that is
in a new Congressional District after redistricting has taken place. Using
the new Congressional District maps implemented after the 2000 and 2010
U.S. Censuses gives two instances to measure this change and analyze its
political eﬀects. After each instance of redistricting, some ZIP Codes remain
in the same Congressional Districts so these ZIP Codes are assigned 0 for
redistricting. For other ZIP Codes, the entire ZIP Code is placed in new
Congressional Districts so these ZIP Codes are assigned 1 for redistricting.
In the last case, there are ZIP Codes that are split between Congressional
Districts so that a fraction of the ZIP Code changes districts while the other
fraction does not. For these ZIP Codes the fraction of the ZIP Code that
changes districts is the measure used for redistricting. The average fraction
of a ZIP Code that changes districts is 0.22 with a standard deviation of 0.38.
In order to measure redistricting at the Congressional Districts level, the
measure is simply the fraction of overlap between the districts before and
after redistricting takes place. This fraction is calculated as the fraction of
the population in the new Congressional District that was in the previous
Congressional District. As a result, the measure also takes values between 0
and 1 inclusively.
To analyze individual campaign contributions, individual campaign con-
tributions are ﬁrst limited to contributions to political campaigns for the
U.S. House of Representatives. This is because these campaigns and contri-
butions are the ones aﬀected by redistricting. These transactions are then
aggregated to the ZIP Code level. The periods of analysis are 1999-2010 for
the redistricting process determined by the 2000 U.S. Census and 2009-2012
for the redistricting process determined by the 2010 U.S. Census. Using both
periods allows for a comparison across two instances of redistricting to verify
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that the eﬀects of redistricting found in one period hold across the other
period as well.
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for individual campaign contribu-
tions at the ZIP Code level for the 2000s period of analysis.
Table 3.1: Individual Contri. Summary Statistics 1999-2010
Variable Number of Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Total ZIP Code Contri. 99,145 17,340 50,924.69
Number of ZIP Code Contri. 99,145 25.32 64.72
Mean ZIP Code Contri. 99,145 594.6 314.3243
Frac ZIP Code Redistr. 99,145 0.2228 0.3815
No Incumbent 99,145 0.0405 0.1915
Average Income (2000 dollars) 99,145 46,159.7 36,482.18
Total ZIP Code Pop 99,145 15,600 15,395.68
Pop Density (per sq. mile) 99,145 1,929.19 5,847.033
Percent College Grads 99,145 0.1562 0.0876
Percent Male 99,145 0.4946 0.0315
Percent White 99,145 0.814 0.2027
Percent Age 55+ 99,145 0.2558 0.0841
Percent Married 99,145 0.5468 0.1074
Election Cycle 2000 15,791
Election Cycle 2002 16,133
Election Cycle 2004 16,656
Election Cycle 2006 17,127
Election Cycle 2008 16,783
Election Cycle 2010 16,655
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics for individual campaign contribu-
tions to campaigns for the U.S. House of Representatives at the ZIP Code
level for the 2010s period of analysis.
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Table 3.2: Individual Contri. Summary Statistics 2009-2012
Variable Number of Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Total ZIP Code Contri. 32,488 22,409 63,730.43
Number of ZIP Code Contri. 32,488 29.81 74.61
Mean ZIP Code Contri. 32,488 647.2 383.4173
Frac ZIP Code Redistr. 32,488 0.2829 0.4165
No Incumbent 32,488 0.0559 0.2243
Average Income (2010 dollars) 32,488 23,272.8 31,989.2
Total ZIP Code Pop 32,488 15,643.2 15,989.1
Pop Density (per sq. mile) 32,488 1,804.07 6,001.809
Percent College Grads 32,488 0.1603 0.0886
Percent Male 32,488 0.4965 0.0375
Percent White 32,488 0.8129 0.2013
Percent Age 55+ 32,488 0.2871 0.0935
Percent Married 32,488 0.5202 0.1158
Election Cycle 2010 16,244
Election Cycle 2012 16,244
Table 3.3 present the number of ZIP Codes in each Cook PVI category for
a Congressional District in the 2009-2012 period of analysis.
Table 3.3: Cook PVI Category Summary Statistics 2009-2012
Cook PVI Category Number of Obs
I[0− 5] 7,188
I[5− 10] 9,145
I[10− 15] 7,163
I[15+] 7,116
O[0− 5] 735
O[5− 10] 185
O[10+] 4
Table 3.4 presents the number of ZIP Codes for each Cook PVI category
change for the 2009-2012 period of analysis.
Since data from the FEC on itemized campaign expenditures is limited
to after the 2003-2004 election cycle, analysis of the eﬀect of redistricting
on campaign spending strategies only examines the redistricting process in
accordance with the 2010 U.S. Census. In this analysis, the unit of analysis
is a political campaign for the U.S. House of Representatives in a particular
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Table 3.4: Cook PVI Category Change 2009-2012
Cook PVI Category Change Number of Obs
I[0− 5]→ I[5− 10] 1,833
I[0− 5]→ I[10− 15] 461
I[0− 5]→ I[15+] 218
I[0− 5]→ O[0− 5] 274
I[0− 5]→ O[10+] 8
I[5− 10]→ I[10− 15] 1,425
I[5− 10]→ I[15+] 459
I[5− 10]→ I[0− 5] 1,395
I[5− 10]→ O[0− 5] 14
I[5− 10]→ O[5− 10] 8
I[10− 15]→ I[15+] 1,035
I[10− 15]→ I[5− 10] 875
I[10− 15]→ I[0− 5] 433
I[15+]→ I[10− 15] 1,209
I[15+]→ I[5− 10] 406
I[15+]→ I[0− 5] 90
No Change 17,281
O[0− 5]→ I[0− 5] 675
O[0− 5]→ I[5− 10] 152
O[0− 5]→ I[10− 15] 6
O[0− 5]→ I[15+] 12
O[5− 10]→ O[0− 5] 4
O[5− 10]→ I[0− 5] 90
O[5− 10]→ I[5− 10] 138
O[5− 10]→ I[10− 15] 85
O[5− 10]→ I[15+] 2
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election cycle. The extent to which these political campaigns are exposed to
redistricting is measured by the population overlap between the candidate's
previous Congressional District and his or her new Congressional District.
Data for this analysis is limited to data from the 2009-2010 and 2011-2012
election cycles. Table 3.5 presents summary statistics for this analysis.
Table 3.5: Campaign Spending Summary Statistics
Variable Number of Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Total Expend. 1,034 1,300,434 1,565,662
Party Committee Contri. 1,034 2,357.94 5,388.431
Gen. Elect Expend. 758 619,590 795,238
Pri. Elect Expend. 840 524,664 648,946.9
Share Gen. Elect Expend. 758 0.4354 0.2588
Fundraising Expend. 912 164,473 343,164.6
Advertising Expend. 942 397,948 610,239.3
Other Expend. 912 721,732 764,788.6
Share Fundraising Expend. 912 0.1449 0.1328
Share Advertising Expend. 942 0.2622 0.2316
Share Other Expend. 912 0.5986 0.2151
Candidate Redistr. 1,034 0.2994 0.2446
Signed Change Cook PVI 1,034 -0.1654 5.4158
Candidate Cook PVI 1,034 7.932 11.1868
Incumbents 691
Challengers 271
Open 72
Gen. Elect Obs 860
Pri. Only Obs 174
The data show that contributions to campaigns for the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives and spending by campaigns for the U.S. House of Representatives
are signiﬁcant. Given the fraction of the political process in the U.S. devoted
to collecting contributions and then spending them and the large impact of
redistricting on the U.S. House of Representatives, analyzing the eﬀect of
redistricting on these activities is important for expanding knowledge of U.S.
politics.
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3.4 Empirical Speciﬁcations and Results
3.4.1 Individual Contributions
Redistricting can ﬁrst be used to to see how individual contributors respond
to changes in the partisan composition of their Congressional District. Be-
cause redistricting can result in signiﬁcant changes to a Congressional Dis-
trict's geographic boundaries, large changes to a district's Cook PVI category
can be observed. Otherwise, a district's Cook PVI category is likely to only
change slowly over time as the electorate shifts. Therefore, redistricting can
be used to analyze the eﬀect of large changes in a district's partisan compo-
sition that are unlikely to occur outside of the redistricting process.
Since a district's Cook PVI measures its lean towards the Democratic Party
or the Republican Party, the eﬀects of the district's partisan composition are
going to be most relevant in the general election. Therefore, the analysis of
how changes to the partisan composition of Congressional Districts impacts
individual contributions is limited to contributions made for the general elec-
tion campaign. Individual contributions made to a general election campaign
are identiﬁed as all individual contributions made to a campaign for the U.S.
House of Representatives after the date of the last primary election in the
state. While some individual contributions made before these dates may be
made with the general election in mind, it is diﬃcult to separate out which
contributions are intended for the general election and which contributions
are intended for the primary election. Individual contributions made after
the date of the primary election in the state are cleanly identiﬁed as contri-
butions to a general election campaign. The model for this analysis is shown
below.
yit = α0 + α1 ∗DistrictCookPV ICategoryChange ∗ ElectionCycleit
+ α2 ∗ CookPV IDummiesit +Xitβ + µi + δt + it
(3.1)
The dependent variable is calculated for each ZIP Code, i, in each election
cycle, t. The coeﬃcient α1 measures the impact of the change in the district's
partisan composition on individual contributions. The speciﬁcation controls
for demographic characteristics of the ZIP Codes, Xit, and contains ZIP
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Code ﬁxed eﬀects, µi, and election cycle ﬁxed eﬀects, δt. Standard errors
are clustered at the ZIP Code level. The following tables present results
on the eﬀects of changes in a district's partisan composition on individual
contributions.
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 show the results of the regression on individual con-
tributions to the district's incumbent party and changes to the district's
partisan composition. Statistical signiﬁcance is diﬃcult to ﬁnd among small
changes to the Cook PVI category likely due to the small impact it has on
individual contributions. The results do suggest, though, that in districts in
competitive ranges where the advantage or disadvantage to the incumbent
is between 0 and 5 percentage points, small shifts towards the incumbent
increase individual contributions to the incumbent. The estimates show that
total contributions are 3 times larger when the district shifts slightly against
the incumbent to slightly in favor of the incumbent compared to districts
that do not change Cook PVI categories. This increase in the total amount
of contributions is driven by both the extensive margin with about 1.6 times
more contributions and the intensive margin with 2.8 times larger average
contributions compared to districts that do not change Cook PVI categories.
The results for the impact of changes to a district's partisan composition
on individual contributions are clearer for medium-sized changes. The eﬀects
of shifts in the district's partisan composition are largest when the district
shifts into a competitive range or out of a competitive range. Shifts where
the district remains in uncompetitive ranges result in smaller and statistically
insigniﬁcant eﬀects. A ZIP Code in a district that shifts into a competitive
range where the incumbent only has a slight advantage of 0 to 5 percentage
points from an uncompetitive range where the incumbent had an advantage
of 10 to 15 percentage points increases its total contributions to the incum-
bent by 6 times compared to a district that does not change categories. Again
this is driven by both the extensive margin where the number of contributions
increases by 3 times and the intensive margin where the average contribution
increases by about 5.9 times. The eﬀect has a similar magnitude in reverse
where ZIP Codes in a district that shifts towards the incumbent from a com-
petitive range to an uncompetitive range decrease total contributions, the
number of contributions, and the average contribution. Shifts in categories
from a disadvantage to the incumbent to an advantage to the incumbent still
within competitive ranges are not statistically signiﬁcant suggesting individ-
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Table 3.6: Individual Contri. Incumbent Party Results 2009-2012
ln(Tot. Contri.) ln(Count) ln(Mean)
CookPVICatChange*2012
Small changes
I[15+]→ I[10− 15] -1.8387 -1.2123 -2.0890
(1.183) (0.5563)** (1.0958)*
I[10− 15]→ I[15+] -0.8072 -0.0077 -0.4068
(1.1988) (0.5644) (1.1087)
I[10− 15]→ I[5− 10] 3.5021 1.4473 3.7421
(3.1727) (1.6327) (2.7771)
I[5− 10]→ I[10− 15] -3.852 -1.6083 -4.0458
(3.165) (1.6293) (2.7696)
I[5− 10]→ I[0− 5] 3.1609 1.7187 2.4887
(2.9958) (1.5389) (2.5912)
I[0− 5]→ I[5− 10] -2.8518 -1.5576 -2.2745
(2.9936) (1.5378) (2.5891)
O[0− 5]→ I[0− 5] 3.2225 1.6281 2.7733
(0.6540)*** (0.3095)*** (0.6119)***
Medium changes
I[15+]→ I[5− 10] 4.0864 1.4992 3.7143
(2.9823) (1.5516) (2.5893)
I[5− 10]→ I[15+] -4.3938 -1.5843 -4.0426
(2.9780) (1.8529) (2.5847)
I[10− 15]→ I[0− 5] 6.2776 2.9817 5.8931
(1.3499)*** (0.6801)*** (1.2783)***
I[0− 5]→ I[10− 15] -5.8761 -2.718 -5.6332
(1.3159)*** (0.6631)*** (1.2511)***
O[0− 5]→ I[5− 10] 2.6149 1.2234 2.4090
(3.0306) (1.5549) (2.6258)
O[5− 10]→ I[0− 5] 1.0953 0.6100 1.0514
(1.0643) (0.5485) (1.0382)
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Election Cycle FE Yes Yes Yes
ZIP Code FE Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 32,995 32,995 32,995
*** indicates p < 0.01, ** indicates p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.1
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Table 3.7: Individual Contri. Incumbent Party Results 2009-2012
ln(Tot. Contri.) ln(Count) ln(Mean)
CookPVICatChange*2012
Large changes
I[15+]→ I[0− 5] 6.8464 2.7568 6.2935
(1.0117)*** (0.5341)*** (0.9869)***
I[0− 5]→ I[15+] -6.7713 -2.8023 -6.0447
(0.7604)*** (0.4312)*** (0.7589)***
I[5− 10]→ O[5− 10] -1.4447 -0.4009 -1.9246
(1.1546) (0.6117) (1.1012)*
O[5− 10]→ I[10− 15] -3.4006 -1.3462 -3.8145
(3.7429) (1.8529) (3.4339)
I[0− 5]→ O[10+] 0.6712 0.3102 0.6836
(0.2996)** (0.1938) (0.2593)***
O[0− 5]→ I[15+] -0.2782 0.9253 -1.0056
(0.3770) (0.389)** (0.3087)***
O[5− 10]→ I[5− 10] -0.7210 -0.4009 -0.2536
(3.1143) (1.6092) (2.7174)
DistrictCookPVICat
I[5− 10] 3.0446 1.6105 2.4988
(2.985) (1.5339) (2.5807)
I[10− 15] 6.6102 3.0658 6.3184
(1.2575)*** (0.6377)*** (1.1969)***
I[15+] 6.1756 2.5147 5.5278
(0.5345)*** (0.3475)*** (0.5650)***
O[0− 5] 4.8778 2.3769 4.3476
(0.5216)*** (0.246)*** (0.4903)***
O[5− 10] 4.2116 1.9983 4.0281
(0.5193)*** (0.3419)*** (0.5534)***
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Election Cycle FE Yes Yes Yes
ZIP Code FE Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 32,995 32,995 32,995
*** indicates p < 0.01, ** indicates p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.1
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uals continue to contribute similar amounts because the elections in these
districts remain competitive.
Large shifts into and out of competitive ranges show similar eﬀects to
medium-sized shifts with shifts into competitive ranges signiﬁcantly increas-
ing individual contributions to the incumbent while shifts out of competitive
ranges signiﬁcantly decreasing individual contributions to the incumbent by
similar magnitudes. Individual contributions to the challenging candidate
are also important. Tables 3.8 and 3.9 show the results of the regression on
individual contributions to the district's opposing party and changes to the
district's partisan composition.
Again statistical signiﬁcance is diﬃcult to ﬁnd among small changes to
the Cook PVI category likely due to the small impact it has on individual
contributions. However, there are some statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects when
the district is shifting between relatively uncompetitive ranges. The results
do suggest that in districts in uncompetitive ranges where the advantage to
the incumbent shifts between an advantage greater than 15 percentage points
to an advantage between 10 and 15 percentage points, small shifts towards
the incumbent decrease individual contributions to the challenging candidate
while small shifts away from the incumbent increase individual contributions
to the challenging candidate. The estimates show that total contributions
are about 5 times larger when the district has a small shift against the in-
cumbent compared to districts that do not change Cook PVI categories. This
increase in the total amount of contributions is driven by both the extensive
margin with about 2 times more contributions and the intensive margin with
5 times larger average contributions compared to districts that do not change
Cook PVI categories. The results are similar in magnitude going in to re-
verse direction when the district has small shift towards to incumbent. The
estimates show that total contributions are about 4 times smaller when the
district has a small shift toward the incumbent compared to districts that do
not change Cook PVI categories. This increase in the total amount of con-
tributions is driven by both the extensive margin with about 1.3 times fewer
contributions and the intensive margin with about 4 times smaller average
contributions compared to districts that do not change Cook PVI categories.
Medium-sized changes show more statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on individ-
ual contributions to candidates challenging the incumbent. For individuals
contributing to candidates challenging the incumbent, the results suggest
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Table 3.8: Individual Contri. Oppo. Party Results 2009-2012
ln(Tot. Contri.) ln(Count) ln(Mean)
CookPVICatChange*2012
Small changes
I[15+]→ I[10− 15] 5.1203 1.963 4.994
(1.045)*** (0.4973)*** (0.9798)***
I[10− 15]→ I[15+] -3.8263 -1.292 -3.9788
(1.0633)*** (0.5077)** (0.9935)***
I[10− 15]→ I[5− 10] -1.3142 0.0297 -2.0805
(2.0302) (0.9447) (1.8042)
I[5− 10]→ I[10− 15] 1.8185 0.2338 2.4477
(2.0167) (0.9384) (1.7905)
I[5− 10]→ I[0− 5] -0.5394 -0.0942 -0.8355
(1.6776) (0.8139) (1.5177)
I[0− 5]→ I[5− 10] 1.5299 0.6649 1.563
(1.6734) (0.812) (1.5136)
O[0− 5]→ I[0− 5] 0.1592 0.0601 0.112
(0.6748) (0.3207) (0.6333)
Medium changes
I[15+]→ I[5− 10] 4.1523 2.2111 3.1748
(1.788)** (0.8255)*** (1.5625)**
I[5− 10]→ I[15+] -5.0611 -2.6409 -3.9962
(1.7845)*** (0.8239)*** (2.5356)**
I[10− 15]→ I[0− 5] -2.5454 -0.4056 -3.5205
(1.4459)* (0.6410) (1.2757)***
I[0− 5]→ I[10− 15] 4.3123 1.2372 5.0227
(1.4348)*** (0.6337)* (1.2676)***
O[0− 5]→ I[5− 10] 1.1811 0.4007 1.4178
(1.7420) (0.8467) (1.5705)
O[5− 10]→ I[0− 5] -3.5134 -1.2102 -3.8912
(1.3467)*** (0.5592)** (1.2177)***
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Election Cycle FE Yes Yes Yes
ZIP Code FE Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 32,995 32,995 32,995
*** indicates p < 0.01, ** indicates p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.1
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Table 3.9: Individual Contri. Oppo. Party Results 2009-2012
ln(Tot. Contri.) ln(Count) ln(Mean)
CookPVICatChange*2012
Large changes
I[15+]→ I[0− 5] 1.9635 1.2535 0.9236
(1.2554) (0.5437)** (1.0782)
I[0− 5]→ I[15+] -2.2198 -1.4794 -1.0954
(1.1316)* (0.4769)*** (0.9551)
I[5− 10]→ O[5− 10] -4.0262 -2.3064 -3.2142
(2.6460) (1.2107)* (2.5356)
O[5− 10]→ I[10− 15] -3.4006 -1.3462 -3.8145
(3.7429) (1.8529) (3.4339)
I[0− 5]→ O[10+] -0.4692 -0.0022 -0.5341
(0.2694)* (0.1817) (0.2491)**
O[0− 5]→ I[15+] -0.2782 0.9253 -1.0056
(0.3770) (0.389)** (0.3087)***
O[5− 10]→ I[5− 10] 2.0160 1.3406 1.3069
(1.8913) (0.8739) (1.6663)
DistrictCookPVICat
I[5− 10] -2.5017 -1.142 -2.4018
(1.6593) (0.8052) (1.5004)
I[10− 15] -4.8651 -1.6372 -5.3741
(1.37)*** (0.6003)*** (1.2052)***
I[15+] 0.4429 0.3986 -0.1506
(0.9368) (0.3651) (0.758)
O[0− 5] -0.2510 -0.1529 -0.2193
(0.5587) (0.2667) (0.5244)
O[5− 10] -0.7802 0.1189 -1.4057
(0.9279) (0.3599) (0.7486)*
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Election Cycle FE Yes Yes Yes
ZIP Code FE Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 32,995 32,995 32,995
*** indicates p < 0.01, ** indicates p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.1
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that these individuals view Cook PVI categories in favor of the incumbent
by 5 to 10 and 10 to 15 percentage points as still competitive for the chal-
lenger. Individual contributions increase in terms of total, the number of
contributions, and the average size of a contribution when the district shifts
to these ranges toward or away from the incumbent. On the other hand, in-
dividual contributions tend to decrease when shifting away from these ranges
either towards or away from the incumbent. The magnitude of the changes
in individual contributions is similar to the previous results. Individual con-
tributors to challengers may see their contributions as more critical to the
challenging candidate when the district is within these ranges compared to
other Cook PVI categories.
For large shifts in the Cook PVI category, the eﬀect on individual contri-
butions to challenging candidates is less statistically signiﬁcant. This could
potentially be due to shifts between categories where individual contributors
to challengers see their contributions as not substantially changing in impor-
tance to the election. While these results provide evidence on how individuals
respond to changes in the partisan composition of their district, the redis-
tricting process allows further analysis of the impact of redistricting on both
individual contributions to campaigns for the U.S. House of Representatives
and campaign spending strategies utilized by these campaigns.
A strategy that can be used to estimate the causal eﬀects of redistricting
itself on individual contributions to campaigns for the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives is the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach. ZIP Codes that largely
remain in the same Congressional District provide a control group for ZIP
Codes that largely change Congressional Districts. Comparisons of the 1999-
2000 election cycle with the later election cycles provide before and after
periods for the redistricting process. This approach is used to study how
total contributions from a ZIP Code, the number of contributions from a
ZIP Code, and the mean contribution in a ZIP Code change.
The model is shown below.
yit = α0 + α1 ∗ FractionRedistricted ∗ElectionCycleit +Xitβ + µi + δt + it
(3.2)
The dependent variable is calculated for each ZIP Code, i, in each elec-
tion cycle, t. The coeﬃcient α1 is the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences coeﬃcient
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corresponding to how much the dependent variable changes in ZIP Codes
that change districts after redistricting. The speciﬁcation controls for demo-
graphic characteristics of the ZIP Codes, Xit, and contains ZIP Code ﬁxed
eﬀects, µi, and election cycle ﬁxed eﬀects, δt. Standard errors are clustered at
the ZIP Code level. Table 3.10 presents results on the eﬀects of redistricting
on individual contributions.
The results show a temporary surge in political contributions in total
amounts, number of contributions, and mean contribution that fades after the
initial election cycle with new districts. Compared to the 2000 election cycle,
ZIP Codes in completely new Congressional Districts showed an increase of
9.18% in total contributions for the 2002 election cycle. The number of con-
tributions also increased by 4.19%, and the mean contribution increased by
4.98% for these ZIP Codes. For the election cycles 2004 and onward, these
coeﬃcients are typically statistically insigniﬁcant and consistently smaller.
To examine if these eﬀects hold for the most recent redistricting cycle.
The same regression is run on data for the election cycles 2009-2010 and
2011-2012 which take place before and after the 2010 U.S. Census resulted
in new Congressional Districts. Table 3.11 presents the results from this
redistricting cycle.
The results from the most recent redistricting cycle are broadly in line with
the previous results. Political contributions in total amounts and number of
contributions are higher in ZIP Codes the change Congressional Districts
compared to ZIP Codes that do not. Compared to the 2010 election cycle,
ZIP Codes in completely new Congressional Districts showed an increase of
6.47% in total contributions for the 2012 election cycle. The number of con-
tributions also increased by 5.71%. There is no statistically signiﬁcant change
in the mean contribution suggesting that the increase in total contributions
is almost entirely along the extensive margin.
These results conﬁrm that redistricting has an important impact on politi-
cal contributions. However, the results are surprising since ZIP Codes in new
Congressional Districts may be reasonably expected to contribute less since
the political candidates running in these elections may be unfamiliar to them.
The results show, though, that the political process is complex and suggests
that the actions of potential contributors interact with multiple elements of
the political process. Not only does redistricting aﬀect the candidates to
whom an individual may consider contributing, but the campaign strategies
44
Table 3.10: Individual Contri. Results 1999-2010
ln(Tot. Contri.) ln(Count) ln(Mean)
Redistrict*Elect 2002 0.0918 0.0419 0.0498
(0.0233)*** (0.0197)** (0.0103)***
Redistrict*Elect 2004 0.0393 0.0143 0.025
(0.0255) (0.0212) (0.0116)**
Redistrict*Elect 2006 0.0603 0.0284 0.0319
(0.0265)** (0.0219) (0.0119)***
Redistrict*Elect 2008 0.006 -0.0174 0.0234
(0.0275) (0.0225) (0.0124)*
Redistrict*Elect 2010 0.0104 -0.0159 0.0265
(0.0276) (0.0225) (0.0125)**
No Incumbent 0.3732 0.343 0.0303
(0.0164)*** (0.0137)*** (0.0074)**
ln(Pop) 0.5467 0.512 0.0347
(0.0488)*** (0.0410)*** (0.0191)*
ln(Pop Density) 0.1222 0.0898 0.0324
(0.0309)*** (0.0256)*** (0.0142)**
ln(Avg. Income) 0.3311 0.2364 0.105
(0.0384)*** (0.0308)*** (0.0174)***
Per. College Grads 1.0471 1.0638 -0.0165
(0.2738)*** (0.2226)*** (0.1235)
Per. Male -0.0644 0.0021 -0.073
(0.3779) (0.3033) (0.1754)
Per. White 0.0401 -0.093 0.1287
(0.1354) (0.1110) (0.0617)**
Per. Age 55+ 1.504 1.489 0.0143
(0.2022)*** (0.1629)*** (0.0975)
Per. Married 0.3924 0.3499 0.0348
(0.1779)** (0.1393)** (0.0838)
Election Cycle FE Yes Yes Yes
ZIP Code FE Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 99,146 99,146 99,146
*** indicates p < 0.01, ** indicates p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.1
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Table 3.11: Individual Contri. Results 2009-2012
ln(Tot. Contri.) ln(Count) ln(Mean)
Redistrict*Elect 2012 0.0647 0.0571 0.0076
(0.0210)*** (0.0167)*** (0.0108)
No Incumbent 0.337 0.339 -0.002
(0.0284)*** (0.0236)*** (0.0139)
ln(Pop) 0.2238 0.2291 -0.0054
(0.1112)** (0.0948)** (0.0621)
ln(Pop Density) -0.0583 -0.1059 0.0476
(0.0970) (0.0836) (0.0640)
ln(Avg. Income) -0.0743 -0.0435 -0.0308
(0.0159)*** (0.0127)*** (0.0085)***
Per. College Grads -2.4905 -1.7753 -0.7152
(1.1366)** (0.9050)* (0.6180)
Per. Male -1.9341 -1.2086 -0.7255
(1.6847) (1.3507) (0.9082)
Per. White 2.2116 1.313 0.8989
(0.6042)*** (0.4809)*** (0.3382)***
Per. Age 55+ -0.6913 0.1035 -0.7949
(0.8952) (0.6903) (0.5195)
Per. Married 1.2099 1.3728 -0.1629
(0.8117) (0.6354)** (0.4606)
Election Cycle FE Yes Yes Yes
ZIP Code FE Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 32,940 32,940 32,940
*** indicates p < 0.01, ** indicates p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.1
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pursued by these candidates may change in response to redistricting as well.
Furthermore, the evidence here suggests that potential contributors adapt
relatively quickly to the new political landscape created by redistricting by
returning to typical contribution patterns in the subsequent election cycles.
3.4.2 Campaign Results
Given the interaction between campaign contributions from individuals and
the campaign strategies candidates pursue, in order to fully analyze the eﬀect
of redistricting on the political process, an analysis of the eﬀect of redistrict-
ing on political campaigns is necessary. To control for potential confounding
variables due to unobservable characteristics of the political candidates, this
analysis uses repeat candidates for oﬃce in the U.S. House of Representatives
for the 2010 and 2012 elections. Using repeat candidates as an identiﬁcation
strategy has been utilized before in Levitt (1994). The advantage of this
strategy is that it allows the analysis to control for time invariant diﬀerences
between political candidates. While repeat candidates for oﬃce in the U.S.
House of Representatives is a selected sample, given the high reelection rates
for incumbents in the U.S. House of Representatives, it encompasses a large
portion of the candidates running for oﬃce in the U.S. House of Representa-
tives.
From the perspective of the candidates running for oﬃce in the U.S. House
of Representatives, redistricting can impact their Congressional Districts
with two related, but distinct eﬀects. As noted by Yoshinaka and Mur-
phy (2009), redistricting can change the population in a district even if the
partisan make up of the district is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected. The change in
the population of the district may aﬀect the strategies the candidate's cam-
paign pursues even if the Cook PVI of the district does not shift toward or
away from the candidate in a meaningful way. Therefore, using both the
change in the district's Cook PVI and the fraction of the district that has
been redistricted are important for this analysis. The fraction of the dis-
trict that has been redistricted in this analysis is measured by the fraction
of a Congressional District that is new from the perspective of the candidate
running after the redistricting process. The values range between 0 and 1
depending on how extensive the candidate's district has changed after re-
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districting. The change in the Cook PVI of the candidate's Congressional
District for the 2010 and 2012 elections provides another eﬀect of redistricting
on political campaigns. The Cook PVI of the district provides information
about the political environment in which the campaign is operating. This
analysis uses the convention that a positive number for the change in the
Cook PVI indicates a more favorable environment for the candidate's cam-
paign after redistricting while a negative number indicates a less favorable
environment after redistricting. The values of this measure are how many
percentage points the district's Cook PVI has changed toward or away from
the candidate as a result of the redistricting process.
The model used for this analysis is shown below.
yit = α0 + α1 ∗ FractionRedistricted ∗ ElectionCycleit
+ α2 ∗ ChangeInPV I ∗ ElectionCycleit
+Xitβ + µi + δt + it
(3.3)
This analysis uses repeat candidates i over the two election cycles t. The
dependent variables, yit, are various measures of the campaign's strategy
such as how much the campaign spends on the general election vs. the
primary election and how the campaign's expenditures on fundraising and
advertising activities are aﬀected. The interaction between the redistricting
variable and the 2012 election cycle, α1, provides the eﬀect of redistricting on
political campaigns just due to new constituents. The interaction between
the change in the Cook PVI and the 2012 election cycle, α2, is the eﬀect
of redistricting on political campaigns because the proportion of potential
supporters to opposers has changed. Controls include demographic data for
the Congressional District as well as whether the candidate is an incumbent,
challenger, or open and if the candidate participated in the general election.
Fixed eﬀects for the candidates, µi and the election cycle, δt are included.
Standard errors are clustered at the candidate level.
Table 3.12 presents the results on how party committees react to redis-
tricting and how campaigns change their overall level of spending.
The evidence suggests that candidates with more new constituents due
to redistricting receive more contributions from party committees and also
spend more in total campaign spending. The estimated eﬀect for contribu-
tions from party committees implies that a candidate whose portion of new
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Table 3.12: Campaign Finance Results
ln(Party Comm Contri.) ln(Total Expend.)
Redistrict*Elect 2012 2.7822 0.4109
(1.0400)*** (0.1937)**
PVIChange*Elect 2012 -0.3098 -0.0656
(0.0892)*** (0.0374)*
Election Cycle 2012 -1.9734 -0.233
(0.5150)*** (0.0922)**
District Controls Yes Yes
Candidate FE Yes Yes
Number of Obs 1,034 1,034
*** indicates p < 0.01, ** indicates p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.1
constituents is 50% receives 139% more contributions of party committees.
The strategy of party committees appears to increase support to candidates
that have more new constituents to which the candidate may need to reach
out. Party committees also contribute more to candidates who are worse oﬀ
after redistricting contributing 155% more to candidates who lose 5 percent-
age points as measured by the Cook PVI.
A campaign whose portion of new constituents is 50% responds by increas-
ing total campaign spending by 21%. There is also some weak evidence that
campaigns are also able to respond to losing support within the district. The
estimates suggest that a campaign whose candidate is 5 percentage points
worse oﬀ as measured by the Cook PVI increases spending by 33%.
Changes is the partisan composition of a Congressional District can also
aﬀect the level of competition a candidate faces in the general election com-
pared to the primary election. Table 3.13 presents the results on how cam-
paigns react in the general election and the primary election because of re-
districting.
The extent to which a candidate's district becomes less favorable to the
candidate and perhaps more competitive as measured by the Cook PVI of
the district aﬀects the campaign's spending in the general election. The
estimates suggest that a campaign whose candidate is 5 percentage points
worse oﬀ as measured by the Cook PVI increases spending in the general
election by 69%. This paper cannot ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant impact
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Table 3.13: Campaign Spending Results
ln(Gen. Exp.) ln(Pri. Exp.) Share Gen.
Redistrict*Elect 2012 0.6686 0.4755 -0.0123
(0.5148) (0.3403) (0.0642)
PVIChange*Elect 2012 -0.1373 -0.0011 -0.012
(0.0417)*** (0.0366) (0.0064)*
Election Cycle 2012 -0.8357 -0.3062 -0.0905
(02159)*** (0.1540)** (0.0285)***
District Controls Yes Yes Yes
Candidate FE Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 758 838 758
*** indicates p < 0.01, ** indicates p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.1
of redistricting on spending in the primary election. However, there is some
weak evidence that campaigns shift spending from the primary election to the
general election when losing partisan support in the district. A 5 percentage
point loss of partisan support results in the campaign spending 6 percentage
points more on the general election as a share of total spending.
Campaigns can also respond to redistricting by changing how much they
spend on fundraising activities, advertising, and other campaign expendi-
tures. Table 3.14 presents results on how campaigns change their spending
in speciﬁc categories.
The evidence suggests that fundraising activities are crucial to candi-
dates who lose partisan support, but candidates respond to new constituents
through advertising regardless of the partisan composition of those new con-
stituents. A 5 percentage point loss of partisan support results in the cam-
paign spending 45% more on fundraising activities. This may be because
campaigns have a harder time soliciting contributions from opposing con-
stituents or realize that they will need to spend more to win the election and
consequently spend more eﬀort fundraising to obtain the necessary resources.
A campaign's advertising strategy does not appear to respond to changes
in the district's partisanship, but does respond to the introduction of new
constituents. While the eﬀect of a change in the Cook PVI of the district
is not statistically signiﬁcant, a campaign facing a constituency that is 50%
new will increasing spending on advertising by 50%.
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Table 3.14: Campaign Spending Cat Results
ln(Fund. Exp.) ln(Ad Exp.) ln(Other Exp.)
Redistrict*Elect 2012 0.43 0.9962 0.2945
(0.2681) (0.5035)** (0.1724)*
PVIChange*Elect 2012 -0.0891 -0.0183 -0.0306
(0.0183)*** (0.0594) (0.0093)***
Election Cycle 2012 -0.1875 -0.8675 -0.1233
(0.1345) (0.2434)*** (0.0852)
District Controls Yes Yes Yes
Candidate FE Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 912 942 912
*** indicates p < 0.01, ** indicates p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.1
Other campaign expenditures such as administrative expenses and travel
reimbursement also increase with a loss of partisan support. The eﬀect is
smaller compared with fundraising, but a 5 percentage point loss of partisan
support results in the campaign spending 15% more on other expenditures.
Other expenditures may also increase in response to more new constituents
independent of changes in partisan support. The estimated eﬀect is a 50%
new constituency results in an increase of 15% in other expenditures.
Table 3.15 presents results on how campaigns change the composition of
their spending in response to redistricting.
The evidence is broadly in line with the results from analyzing the total
expenditure in each category. While no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect can be
found on the share of total campaign spending spent on fundraising activi-
ties, the share of total campaign spending spent on advertising increases in
response to new constituents. As before, the increase in advertising spending
does not appear to be related to a loss of partisan support. A campaign fac-
ing a constituency that is 50% new will increasing its share of total spending
on advertising by 5.4 percentage points. The evidence suggests this is being
supported by a decrease in the share of other expenditures by 5.7 percentage
points with no impact on the share spent on fundraising. An improvement in
a campaign's partisan support as measured by the Cook PVI by 5 percent-
age points increases the share spent on other expenditures by 6.5 percentage
points. This suggests that candidates who, because of redistricting end up in
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Table 3.15: Campaign Spending Shares Results
Share Fund. Share Ad Share Other
Redistrict*Elect 2012 -0.0314 0.1081 -0.113
(0.0264) (0.0456)** (0.0378)***
PVIChange*Elect 2012 -0.0038 -0.0036 0.013
(0.0029) (0.0086) (0.0023)***
Election Cycle 2012 0.0224 -0.0804 0.061
(0.0120)* (0.0204)*** (0.0181)***
District Controls Yes Yes Yes
Candidate FE Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 912 942 912
*** indicates p < 0.01, ** indicates p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.1
safer districts, shift spending away from fundraising and advertising toward
other activities. Campaigns may view fundraising and advertising as more
important in competitive elections compared to other campaign activities
and so shift spending depending based on whether the election is expected
to be competitive or not.
The results show how campaigns and party committees may shift their
strategies as a result of the redistricting process. The redistricting process
can change both the proportion of new constituents in a Congressional Dis-
trict and the amount of partisan support a candidate can expect. The strate-
gies of campaigns and party committees may react in diﬀerent ways to the
separate eﬀects. The evidence shows that campaigns respond to more new
constituents by increasing spending on advertising regardless of the parti-
san composition of the new constituents. Party committees also respond
to candidates facing new constituents by contributing more to those candi-
dates separate again from the partisan composition of those new constituents.
Campaigns and party committees of course also react to the change in par-
tisan support brought about by redistricting. Party committees contribute
more to candidates who are made worse oﬀ in terms of partisan support after
redistricting, and campaigns spend more on fundraising activities when made
worse oﬀ. Campaigns will also spend more on other campaign activities, but
as a share of total spending other expenditures increase when the candidate's
district in more favorable as measured by its Cook PVI.
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The increase in fundraising and advertising spending by campaigns as a
consequence of the redistricting process may also help to explain the increase
in individual campaign contributions after redistricting. The results on cam-
paign spending suggest that campaigns respond by increasing outreach to
potential contributors, and the increase in advertising may introduce the dis-
trict's new constituents to the candidate. As a result, both types of spending
may increase individual contributions by increasing solicitation of campaign
contributions and by obtaining contributions from new constituents through
increased awareness of the candidates from advertisements. The results on
individual campaign contributions and campaign spending in response to
the redistricting process show that in any analysis it is important to consider
both aspects of campaign ﬁnance in order eﬀectively understand the political
process and how it is aﬀected by changes in the political environment.
3.5 Conclusion
Redistricting has a major impact on the political process from both the per-
spective of individual contributors and political campaigns. It can change
who the incumbent Representative is for individual contributors and who the
constituents are for the candidate's campaign. Analyzing both contributions
from individuals and campaign spending is necessary to fully understand how
the political process is aﬀected by redistricting. This paper ﬁnds that after
redistricting, districts that shift to more competitive Cook PVI categories
see higher levels of individual contributions. This eﬀect is both on the ex-
tensive margin with more contributions and on the intensive margin with
a higher average contribution. How individuals view the extent to which a
district becomes competitive does seem to diﬀer on whether the individual is
contributing to the incumbent representative or the challenger. Individuals
contributing to the incumbent representative have larger responses to shifts
where the incumbent's advantage is between 0 and 5 percentage points as
measured by the district's Cook PVI. On the other hand, individuals con-
tributing to the challenger respond when the incumbent's advantage is over a
wider range between 5 and 15 percentage points as measured by the district's
Cook PVI. This suggests that individuals contributing to the challenger are
willing to contribute under a more adverse political environment.
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Moreover, perhaps counter-intuitively, this paper also ﬁnds that ZIP Codes
that move to new Congressional Districts contribute more. Given the eﬀects
of redistricting on campaign spending activities, the increase in contributions
can in part be explained by campaigns spending more on fundraising activ-
ities and advertisements. The increase in spending on these activities can
solicit more contributions from individuals with a potentially larger eﬀect
on new constituents. However, the increase in individual contributions is
only signiﬁcant in the election cycle immediately following the redistricting
process. This suggests that both individual contributors and political cam-
paigns adapt quickly to the changes in the political environment initiated by
redistricting.
There is also evidence that party committees respond strategically to re-
districting as well increasing their contributions to candidates who face more
new constituents separate from the partisan composition of those new con-
stituents. Campaigns, furthermore, adjust their spending patterns spending
more on fundraising activities when after redistricting, the district is less fa-
vorable as measured by the district's Cook PVI. However, like party commit-
tees, campaigns also respond to the proportion of new constituents separate
from partisan composition spending more on advertising when there are more
new constituents. Campaigns may see a need to introduce their candidate
to new potential voters whether or not those voters identify with the same
party as the candidate or not.
The results show that the interaction between potential contributors and
campaigns jointly determine the impact of redistricting on campaign ﬁnance.
Focusing only on contributions or only on campaign spending ignores the
linkages between these two activities and prevents a fully comprehensive un-
derstanding on how factors in the political environment aﬀect campaigns and
campaign contributors. Redistricting has huge impacts on the political envi-
ronment that campaigns operate within and within which individuals choose
to make campaign contributions. However, other aspects of the political envi-
ronment change from election to election such as the presence of U.S. Senate
elections in particular states and the passage of new voter identiﬁcation laws
by some states. This paper shows to fully analyze the impact of these events
on the political process requires analyzing both campaign contributions and
campaign spending decisions collectively. The interactions between the two
are what aﬀect the results of the election.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
AND VOTER TURNOUT PROPOSITIONS
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. First, the utility functions for both types of potential voters are quasi-
concave in the strategy used by the potential voter. Since the proof is similar
for both types of potential voters, only the arguments for a potential voter
with signal sA is presented. If a potential voter with signal sA has strictly
positive utility, then it must be the case that usA > 0. Therefore, this
potential voter strictly prefers to vote for candidate A so rA = {0}, a convex
set. On the other hand, if usA < 0, the potential voter strictly prefer to
abstain so rA = {1}, also a convex set. Finally, if the potential voter's utility
is exactly 0, then it must be the case that usA = 0. Then the potential voter
is indiﬀerent between voting for candidate A and abstaining so the potential
voter is willing to abstain with any rate rA ∈ [0, 1]. In all cases, the strategy
set is a convex set so the utility function is quasi-concave.
Next, deﬁne a function f which takes as its arguments rA and rB and
outputs two sets r∗A and r
∗
B which are the voters' optimal abstention rates
given rA and rB. It follows that if u
sA > 0, then r∗A is a singleton consisting
of r∗A = {0} indicating that the voter will vote. If usA < 0, then r∗A is a
singleton consisting of r∗A = {1} indicating that the voter will abstain. If
usA = 0, then r∗A = [0, 1] indicating that the voter is willing to mix between
voting and abstaining. For signal sB voters, if u
sB > 0, then r∗B is a singleton
consisting of r∗B = {0} indicating that the voter will vote. If usB < 0, then r∗B
is a singleton consisting of r∗B = {1} indicating that the voter will abstain. If
usB = 0, then r∗B = [0, 1] indicating that the voter is willing to mix between
voting and abstaining.
The function f is upper hemicontinuous. To see this, note that, Ik, the
modiﬁed Bessel function of the ﬁrst kind, is a continuous function. Then usA
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and usB are continuous functions of rA and rB since u
sA and usB are con-
structed from continuous functions. Consequently, given a point (rˆA, rˆB), if
usA > 0, then there exists a neighborhood R of (rˆA, rˆB) such that u
sA > 0 for
all points in R. Therefore, r∗A = {0} for all points in R. The same argument
holds for usA < 0. If usA = 0 at (rˆA, rˆB), then since r
∗
A = [0, 1], any neigh-
borhood R around (rˆA, rˆB) has the property that r
∗
A ⊂ [0, 1] for all points in
R. Since the same holds true for usB , f is upper hemicontinuous. Moveover,
by the construction of f and the fact that f is upper hemicontinuous, by the
Closed Graph Theorem, f has a closed graph.
Therefore, the function f satisﬁes all the conditions of the Kakutani Fixed-
Point Theorem and so must have a ﬁxed point. The ﬁxed point deﬁnes an
equilibrium where given the voting strategies chosen by the other potential
voters, a potential voter of each type has a best response equal to those
voting strategies.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. In this type of equilibrium, usA = 0. Let
Q−11 =
(
1− q1
q1
)mA0 +1
(A.1)
QrA1 =
(
q1
(1− q1)(1− rA)
) 1
2
(A.2)
and
N rAq1 = n(1− q1)q1((1− q1)q1(1− rA))−
1
2 (A.3)
Using implicit diﬀerentiation with respect to mA0 yields
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− ln
(
1− q1
q1
)
Q−11 e
−nB I0(z)− ln
(
1− q1
q1
)
Q−11 e
−nB QrA1 I1(z)
+ nq1 e
−nA I0(z)
∂rA
∂mA0
+ nq1 e
−nA QrA1 I1(z)
∂rA
∂mA0
+
1
2
(
1
1− rA
)
e−nA QrA1 I1(z)
∂rA
∂mA0
− n(1− q1)Q−11 e−nB I0(z)
∂rA
∂mA0
− n(1− q1)Q−11 e−nB QrA1 I1(z)
∂rA
∂mA0
− 1
2
(
1
1− rA
)
Q−11 e
−nB QrA1 I1(z)
∂rA
∂mA0
+ e−nA I1(z)(−N rAq1 )
∂rA
∂mA0
+ e−nA QrA1
(
I0(z)− 1
z
I1(z)
)(−N rAq1 ) ∂rA∂mA0 −Q−11 e−nB I1(z) (−N rAq1 ) ∂rA∂mA0
−Q−11 e−nB QrA1
(
I0(z)− 1
z
I1(z)
)(−N rAq1 ) ∂rA∂mA0 = 0
(A.4)
The ﬁrst two terms in equation (A.4) are positive since (1 − q1)/q1 < 1.
Because usA = 0, then terms 3-8 must be positive as the positive terms in usA
are multiplied by a larger factor than the negative terms. For n suﬃciently
large, terms 9-12 are also positive. To see this, ﬁrst note that because usA = 0
and e−nA > e−nB , it must be the case that
e−nA I0 (z)−Q−11 e−nB I0 (z) > 0 (A.5)
and
e−nA I0 (z) e−nA Q
rA
1 I1 (z)−Q−11 e−nB QrA1 I1 (z) < 0 (A.6)
With I0(z) > I1(z) and n suﬃciently large, it follows that terms 9-12 in
equation (A.4) again consist of positive terms multiplied by a larger factor
than the negative terms. Therefore, taken as a whole, the result is ∂rA
∂mA0
< 0.
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